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Two Stories About Two Currencies of Care 
HENDRIK HARTOG† 
My work on the history of care has been shaped by a 
desire, a yearning, to discover what the experience of 
caregiving was like, both for the producers and the 
consumers of that care. Of course what I found was never 
that, exactly. Rather, at most, research uncovered 
testimony about how the experience of care was described 
and explored within the confines of litigation, or how the 
experience of care was shaped or constituted by the legal 
culture. Still, my semi-conscious goal was always to get as 
close as I could to something that looked or smelled like 
experience. 
That desire, my yearning, is, of course, a very 
unfashionable one and also one that much critical writing 
(by, among others, Joan Scott) has all but eviscerated.1 
Today that desire has become—or is recognized—as archaic 
and outdated. The search for representative experience is so 
last century. None of my graduate students would be stupid 
enough to admit to such. And they are right, and I am 
wrong. 
Still, I am the product of a social historical moment. My 
education as a historian was shaped—determined—by a 
1970s historian’s fantasy that with sufficient work and 
energy, I could find access to the “real” experiences of 
ordinary people in everyday parts of their lives. I have 
carried some version of that fantasy with me through most 
of my working life as a historian. There have been precious 
few instances when legal sources—particularly cases—could 
  
 Unless otherwise indicated, portions of the following discussion have been 
drawn from and expand upon scholarship reported in HENDRIK HARTOG, 
SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL BE YOURS: A HISTORY OF INHERITANCE AND OLD AGE 
(2012). 
† Class of 1921 Bicentennial Professor in the History of American Law and 
Liberty and Director of American Studies at Princeton University.  
 1. See Joan W. Scott, The Evidence of Experience, 17 CRITICAL INQUIRY 773, 
797 (1991). 
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possibly have satisfied that desire. But the desire, the 
aspiration, for traces of experience, for something more than 
discourse, for access to the everyday lives of real people, for 
a way to reconstruct how they lived lives—how they worked 
and fought and played and loved—in the present tense 
(their present tense), that remains.2 
Back around the turn of the new century, in 2000 and 
2001 and 2002 and 2003, I began to work with a body of 
nineteenth and early twentieth century New Jersey cases 
that offered surprising and illuminating portraits of 
carework within families. The cases involved disputes over 
promised but undelivered legacies or inheritances. I had 
begun reading them less out of a social historian’s fantasy 
or yearnings and more because I had enjoyed teaching such 
cases as legal doctrine in the days long past when I had 
been a property law teacher. I was curious both about the 
evolution of that legal doctrine and about the stories that 
produced the legal doctrine. 
But soon I was entranced—I still am—by the 
descriptions of work scattered throughout the testimony in 
the trial records, language that seemed to offer the access 
into an intimate and lost world that I had long yearned for. 
For historians of my generation and inclinations—at least 
for this historian—such access was talismanic magic. 
Reading the transcripts, I felt as if I could see, could smell, 
could hear, the real. There’s nothing quite like a description 
of how it feels to get hands dirty while giving a stepfather 
by marriage an enema or what it means to wrestle a 
demented aunt to the ground as she destroys the family 
furniture.3 But how to make such images and stories parts 
of a history, parts of an analysis of change over time? That 
question stumped me, and it took me a very long time to 
find answers, or ways to answer that question. And in the 
end, you will have to accept that the book is my answer, 
inadequate though it is.  
Here, though, let me offer two stories, both as a way to 
illustrate how the case files I dealt with “speak” or “spoke” 
  
 2. See Hendrik Hartog, Horwitz and the End of Socio-Legal History: 1975, in 
2 TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY—LAW, IDEOLOGY, AND 
METHODS: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF MORTON J. HORWITZ 43-44 (Alfred Brophy & 
Daniel Hamilton eds., 2010). 
 3. HENDRIK HARTOG, SOMEDAY ALL THIS WILL BE YOURS: A HISTORY OF 
INHERITANCE AND OLD AGE 161, 255 (2012). 
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about issues of care and the experience of caretaking and as 
a way to connect the work I did to the more immediate and 
twenty-first century concerns that shape the writings of my 
brilliant copanelists. In particular, these stories suggest 
how Americans once struggled over the contested boundary 
between family member and worker. What did it mean to 
“care”? What did it mean to do “carework”? What were the 
expectations—the reliance interests—that arose within a 
capitalist economy when men and women, usually women 
but not only women, worked to take care of older relatives, 
older family? What did they owe to those who had once 
brought them up? What did it mean that those who did the 
work also found a home within the households of those they 
worked for? 
These may not be questions that one wants raised in a 
conference on careworkers, understood not as family 
members but rather as part of a relatively un- or 
underorganized labor pool, today made up largely of persons 
of color, often participants in global labor movements.4 
Although Klein and Boris describe recent efforts in some 
states to compensate family members for staying home to 
care (kin care), those family members are not the 
centerpiece of their work.5 And if there is a carework 
movement in the offing, it begins, I suspect, with efforts to 
see careworkers, first of all, as workers like other workers, 
as employees, entitled to the benefits that we wish were 
part of the rewards that belonged to all workers within this 
immensely wealthy and profligate society.  
But Someday All This Will Be Yours, like much of my 
work over the past two decades, was, in the first place, a 
work of family history. Much of it is devoted to the legal, 
moral, and emotional situations of adult children, some of 
whom returned to a parental home after a period of time 
working and living elsewhere, some of whom never left. 
How to think about such beings: as adults, that is, as 
persons competent to contract with parents and 
grandparents to provide care? Or, as children, doing what is 
expected of them within a household, perhaps hoping that 
  
 4. See EILEEN BORIS & JENNIFER KLEIN, CARING FOR AMERICA: HOME HEALTH 
WORKERS IN THE SHADOW OF THE WELFARE STATE 4-5 (2012); Eileen Boris & 
Jennifer Klein, “We Have to Take it To the Top!”: Workers, State Policy, and the 
Making of Home Care, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 293 (2013). 
 5. See BORIS & KLEIN, supra note 4, at 34, 49-53. 
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eventually they would be remembered in a will? Can one 
imagine such “children” as contractual actors, contracting 
with parents for compensation? How did it feel to be stuck 
at home, still dependent (or newly dependent) on a parent? 
What were the rewards to which one became entitled? 
Who was an adult child? Or, rather, who could be or 
could become an adult child? Did the identity of an adult 
child depend on birth, on being a blood relation? Nineteenth 
and twentieth century literature—both legal literature and 
imaginative literature—was littered with stories about 
young women, and occasional men, who became adopted 
children by doing the work of care. From Heidi to Little 
Lord Fountleroy to Anne of Green Gables to Pip in Great 
Expectations. All of them performed being daughters or 
sons, and their performances made them into someone who 
should be rewarded as a son or as a daughter because of the 
work they did in caring for those who were their fictive kin. 
Behind the romance of those stories lay an emotional or 
existential fact: many older people were left alone, 
abandoned by their children and grandchildren—their real 
children and grandchildren, who had moved away and who 
lived lives too far away to care.6 The mobility of nineteenth 
century America, indeed, of the whole world, combined with 
the instability of capitalist land markets, undid inherited 
understandings that made staying home a reliable 
expectation for adult children.7 And in a world—a social 
order—in which old age care still depended on family, a 
social order marked by the absence of the public structures 
or the insurance schemes or the corporate marketing to the 
old that mark our days, a social order that was then almost 
entirely dependent on private law, older people had to make 
someone else into their child if they had any hope of a 
happy, that is, a cared-for old age.8 And adoptions—at first 
only informally, later through formal legislative means—
became one way to solve the problem.9 
But what of servants, employees, those who came into a 
household not as “family,” or as potential “family,” but as 
workers? (I should note that I experience so much wrong 
  
 6. See HARTOG, supra note 3, at 67. 
 7. See id. 
 8. See id. at 23-24. 
 9. Id. at 94. 
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with that question the moment I type it into my computer, 
so much unexamined. Everyone in a household was a 
worker. That is, throughout the period I study, a family was 
a place where work occurred. So the distinction between 
worker and family member makes no sense. And as we will 
see, the boundary between worker and family member, even 
when made, was always hard to sustain. And because of the 
deep commitment throughout the legal culture to the Anglo-
American idea of testator’s freedom, no “child,” even a direct 
biological descendant, had anything more than a hope of 
being remembered as an heir. No one was an heir until the 
death of the testator. And any person in the household 
could, in theory, be rewarded with an inheritance.)10 
But what, to ask the question again, of servants and 
employees? That question, however wrongheaded, does lead 
us to the two stories I want to tell. So, let me begin: 
*** 
Consider Cooper v. Colson (1904),11 a case that became 
an important doctrinal precedent in New Jersey and 
elsewhere.12 This was the case of a housekeeper, Margaret 
Sayre, who had been promised one of her employer’s three 
farms if only she would stay and care for him. She stayed 
for more than two decades, never earning more than two or 
three dollars a week, until his death from the consequences 
of what we today would call dementia, perhaps Alzheimer’s. 
She had relied on his promise to give her one of his three 
farms, a promise repeated endlessly. But in the end, that 
promise would not be fulfilled. 
What services had she “performed” or “rendered” for the 
old man? “I did all the work around the place, around the 
house, I cooked for him, and I cooked for his men,—not all 
the time, but at times I used to milk and I went out into the 
fields to work, I dropped corn, and husked corn, and I 
carried the sheaves of wheat and tied them together and 
carried hay to the mow, and I pitched sheaves of wheat and 
  
 10. See id. at 68. 
 11. 58 A. 337 (N.J. 1904). 
 12. The material in the paragraphs that follow is drawn from the transcript 
of the record of Cooper v. Colson. See Transcript of Record at 6-7, 24-27, 31-37, 
42, 46, 52, 54-55, 66-67, 72, 121, 124-25, Cooper v. Colson, 58 A. 337 (N.J. 1904) 
(the record is available at the New Jersey State Library in vol. 320, issue 6) 
[hereinafter Cooper Record]; HARTOG, supra note 3, at 102-06, 185-92, 239-43. 
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I did all that one day, and I used to separate the corn. . . .” 
What did she do for him personally? “I used to cut his hair, I 
had to give him his bath and attend to his clothes, and 
waited on him every way I could.” For how long? “Ever since 
I lived with him, until about a year before he died, I would 
cut his hair every time it wanted it. . . . But the last summer 
we were there I had to give him his bath just like a trained 
nurse would have to do; he could not do it himself.” She 
never received any extra compensation. Not even toward 
the end, when she rented a small house in town where she 
cared for him. “How long had he been queer and 
troublesome on account of the softening of the brain . . . ?” 
“When he got to be real funny, I suppose about six months.” 
“[B]efore that time . . . was [he] any more trouble . . . than 
an ordinary person would be?” “[O]nly at times. There 
would be other times before that that he got so he didn’t 
know how to get his clothes on and I would have to help 
him.”  
Many witnesses confirmed her testimony, both about 
the work she did and the promises he had made. One 
witness reported that the old man had frequently said “that 
all he was giving her was the privilege of raising the poultry 
for her services.” But, he continued, “if she remained with 
him, [presumably until he died] . . . she shall be well repaid 
for her services.” He expected “to deed her the little farm.” 
Another witness testified: “[H]e wanted her to have a farm . 
. . . [f]or being good to him, and working for him, and he 
didn’t think anyone could do like Maggie did for him. . . . 
[N]o ordinary hired girl would ever do for Mr. Colson what 
Maggie Sayre did for Mr. Colson, as there ain’t one-half of 
them cares, and she did care.” Over games of checkers and 
while husking corn, he was always telling listeners that a 
farm or “the” farm was going to be hers. Another witness 
described how he had once asked the old man if he could 
take some apples lying on the ground, “and he says: ‘I have 
plenty of apples there on Maggie’s farm; if you want any, go 
over there and get them.’ . . . and when I was there he came 
up and said to me that that is Maggie’s farm.”13  
After all the testimony had been taken, Vice Chancellor 
Reed summarized how Margaret Sayre’s life had been 
shaped by her relationship with Joseph Colson: She first 
  
 13. Cooper Record, supra note 12, at 36-37; see Cooper, 58 A. at 337; see also 
Stone v. Todd, 8 A. 300, 305 (Sup. Ct. N.J. 1887). 
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went to work for him in 1872, when he lived on a rented 
farm in Salem County. At the time she was paid three 
dollars a week wages. In early 1875, he quit farming, and 
she left and got a job elsewhere, in “service.” In 1876, Colson 
went into the “marl” business. Marl was a loose and 
crumbling earthy deposit consisting mainly of calcite or 
dolomite, used as a fertilizer for soils deficient in lime.14 
Demand for marl boomed as demand for fertilizer rose in 
the farming areas of New Jersey.15 Margaret returned to 
work as his housekeeper at two dollars a week, with the 
understanding that after two years she would receive 
whatever she could make from the poultry she kept, in place 
of wages. But then Colson went back to farming. He bought 
one farm in 1881 and asked her to raise chickens there for 
one-half the profit. She refused the offer. Then he said that 
if she would do as he wanted and stay with him, he would 
leave her a farm. She accepted that offer. But a year and a 
half later Margaret changed her mind and decided to move 
to Montana. But again he convinced her to stay. Once again 
he did so by promising that “if she stayed with him and took 
care of him as long as he lived he would give her a farm.” 
Over the next years, they continued to discuss which farm 
she would take of the three he eventually owned. They lived 
on one or another of those farms until the mid-1890s. 
Throughout all those years, she did all kinds of work that 
went well beyond what a housekeeper ordinarily did. And 
when Joseph Colson became demented and unable to care 
for himself at all, she moved into a house in town, in 
Woodstown, where she nursed and cared for him, until just 
before the end of his life, when he had to be moved into an 
insane asylum. There he died, without a will.16 
What did that history mean? To Vice Chancellor Reed, 
it meant that all of the elements of a contract had been 
proved.17 He ordered that the administrators of Colson’s 
  
 14. See New Jersey Marl, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1869, at 2. 
 15. See id. (describing the boom in the marl business). 
 16. See Cooper Record, supra note 12, at 120-22 (Vice Chancellor’s summary). 
In the 1900 census, when they were living in Woodstown, she is listed as the 
“head” of the household. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
TWELFTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES (1900) (E.D. 187, Woodstown Borough, 
Salem, New Jersey, sheet 1B).  
 17. Cooper Record, supra note 12, at 122. 
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estate convey to her a deed to the “Peterson” farm, one of 
the farms Colson owned at his death. 
But the lawyers for the Colson estate appealed to the 
New Jersey Court for the Correction of Errors and Appeals, 
which reversed, by a vote of nine to two. Margaret Sayre 
would not get her farm. The opinion by Justice Fort began 
with an understanding, drawn from his reading of the 
treatises, that there were two “acts” of part performance 
that would take a “parol agreement” (that is, an oral 
agreement) “out” of the Statute of Frauds and allow a court 
of equity to decree specific performance. One such act was 
“actual open possession” of the land or other property; the 
other was “permanent and valuable improvement” made to 
the land. Each of these he regarded as easy cases. He then 
drew from the early New Jersey cases the conclusion that 
there might in addition be “special acts of personal service 
and the like” that, “when performed upon condition that 
land would be conveyed,” might “entitle the party so 
performing” to a decree for specific performance. The cases 
revealed that when the result of “performance of the labor 
and service under the agreement” had been “to change the 
whole course of the life or life work” then the case was one 
“within” the rule as to part performance, even without 
possession of or improvements to the land. 
But here there was no such transformation of a life. 
Margaret Sayre was a housekeeper when she started; she 
was a housekeeper at the time of Joseph Colson’s death. All 
the work she did, including her intimate bodily care of her 
long-time employer, was coherent with gendered 
expectations of what such women did as routine aspects of 
their lives, whether as paid employees or as kin. There was 
no doubt, Fort conceded, that Margaret had served Colson 
“in part, though not wholly, in reliance upon compensation 
by way of the conveyance of a farm.” But nothing she had 
done was either “exceptional nor extraordinary. . . . She in 
no way changed her mode of living or course of life or life 
work.” And so she would not get the farm she had been 
promised.18 
Fort’s much cited opinion was read by lawyers and 
judges to restate a test that required “exceptional” tasks as 
the proof of a life transformed. Certainly for anyone who 
  
 18. Cooper, 58 A. at 339. 
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was not a blood relative. Performing tasks that were 
coherent or predictable within roles or jobs assumed within 
a family failed that test. Proof of the work done was by itself 
never enough. One had to demonstrate that the work done 
could only be explained by the prior presence of a promise to 
convey property. Everything Margaret Sayre had done was 
just work, perhaps work for which pay was expected, but 
not work that earned one a legacy of a farm. 
By the middle of the nineteenth century, men who gave 
up jobs or careers to care for older property owners at 
“home” often were understood as having passed that test. 
Returning home had become, in the culture and in the law, 
an exceptional undertaking, at least for young men who 
ordinarily left home and entered labor markets. By contrast, 
women who gave up or put off marriages to stay and to care 
for older relatives or employers were not often recognized as 
having made such an undertaking. There were too many 
possible routine and unexceptional reasons why a marriage 
had not occurred. Specific performance required an unusual 
story and an unusual relationship, an undertaking that 
could only be understood through the lens of an 
unquestioned promise to convey valuable property.  
The court in Cooper did acknowledge that Margaret 
should probably succeed if she went back to court and sued 
quantum meruit for unpaid wages, though the amount she 
could get (certainly, much less than a farm!) would be 
limited by statutes of limitation and would possibly only 
incorporate her work in the last years as Colson’s nurse.19 A 
housekeeper would not, however, ordinarily become an 
heiress, that is, someone entitled to land or other property.20 
Consider then, as my second story, a slightly later case, 
Frean v. Hudson, which did involve a suit quantum meruit, 
after a woman was disappointed by an employer’s will.21 
Julia Frean went to court after she discovered that Cornelia 
  
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. The material in the paragraphs that follow is drawn from Frean v. 
Hudson, 93 A. 582, 582-83 (N.J. 1915). See Transcript of Record at 1, 4-9. 12-13. 
15-16, 19-20, 26, 30, 35, 40, 48-54, 57-58, 65-67, 70-96, 99, 103-05, Frean v. 
Hudson, 93 A. 582 (N.J. 1915) (the record is available at the New Jersey State 
Library the record is available at the New Jersey State Library in vol. 636, issue 
5) [hereinafter Frean Record]; see also HARTOG, supra note 3, at 239-51. 
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Hudson had left her only a pittance. Julia had been 
Cornelia’s companion. She had lived in Cornelia’s household 
in Bayonne for more than twenty years, ever since she had 
failed her teacher’s examinations in Staten Island, where 
she had grown up. She was no relation of Cornelia Hudson; 
her parents had been Cornelia’s friends.  
After Cornelia Hudson’s death in 1913 at the age of 
eighty-four, a codicil to her will was found to include a gift 
of $100 to Julia, “as an act of friendship . . . which she is to 
forfeit if she sues my estate or my heirs, as she has no claim 
whatever against me or against my estate.” Julia, who had 
expected much more from the will and who believed that 
Cornelia’s son, Edward Hudson, had fraudulently inserted 
the codicil into the will, protested. Edward, who was 
executor of Cornelia’s estate, offered Julia $500, “to pacify 
her.” At first she accepted the offer. But then she repudiated 
it. And then she sued, asking compensation based on six 
years of work as Cornelia’s “housekeeper and companion” at 
twenty-five dollars a month (the temporal limit of what she 
could ask for, given the statute of limitations on such 
actions), plus three and one half years of work as a nurse at 
an additional fifteen dollars a week. A Hudson County jury 
awarded her $4159.18.22 
On appeal to the New Jersey Court of Errors, Elmer 
Demarest, the lawyer for the estate and for Edward 
Hudson, asked the court to reverse, on the theory that the 
trial judge should never have let the case go to the jury. His 
brief began by insisting that Julia had been “practically a 
member” of Cornelia’s family, and had always been “treated 
as such” by all the members of the household. (Indeed, in a 
later passage in the brief, she was described as treated 
better than other members of the family (which meant son 
Edward, who was the only other recognized member of the 
household.)) “No closer relationship can be imagined 
between persons without consanguinity, than that which 
the respondent [that is, Julia Frean] admits existed 
between her and Mrs. Hudson.” Julia, the brief continued, 
was no nurse. She was “59 years of age, lame, and had no 
experience as a nurse.” She knew perfectly well that “the 
services she was performing were given as though she were 
a member of the family.” She was no servant; she ate at the 
  
 22. See Frean Record, supra note 21, at 70-71, 88-89. Statutes of limitations 
precluded her from asking for more than six years of work. Id. at 3. 
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table with other family members. She and Cornelia acted as 
“mother and daughter.” Julia understood herself as 
possessing “an equal right in the household with the other 
members of the family.” What she did within the household 
she did “because of her affection and friendship for” 
Cornelia. She might have hoped for a legacy, but she knew, 
or ought to have known, that the “tenderness” with which 
Cornelia “cared for her” should have been enough. And she 
should have realized that testator’s freedom meant that 
Cornelia was free to choose to give all of her estate to her 
son, while excluding Julia.23 The main ground of appeal 
then was that Julia’s “admission that the position of the 
parties were in loco parentis” barred her right to anything 
more than the love and appreciation she had received from 
Cornelia Hudson. Thus there should have been a nonsuit.24 
At trial, one year earlier, the work that Julia Frean had 
done for Cornelia Hudson had been described by a maid who 
had long done housework for elderly Cornelia. What had 
Julia done for Cornelia? Helped her do the cleaning, helped 
do the housekeeping and running of the house, everything 
except washing and ironing. And then, after that, Julia sat 
with Cornelia; she did sewing and crocheting, and all the 
mending, “besides waiting on Mrs. Hudson.” She also went 
out on errands for Cornelia, who never left the house. The 
maid had overheard many conversations between Cornelia 
and Julia, with regard to payment for services. Cornelia 
apparently often said “she would give it to her [that is, to 
Julia] if she had it[,] but she did not have it on account of 
her son, Ed Hudson, taking it from her.” When he cross- 
examined her, Demarest had led the maid to describe how 
Mrs. Hudson and Miss Frean, and sometimes Edward 
Hudson, all sat down together at meal times. He was 
pointedly distinguishing the maid as a paid employee from 
Julia, whom he characterized as family. Two next door 
neighbors had added detailed portraits of the work Julia 
Frean did, including material on her serving at the table, 
clearing, dusting, getting rooms cleaned, cleaning the 
  
 23. Id. at 5-6. 
 24. Id. at 5-6, 8-9. She was listed as a part of Cornelia’s household in both the 
1900 and 1910 censuses. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
TWELFTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES (1900) (E.D. 8, Dist. 1, Bayonne City, 
Ward 3, Hudson, New Jersey, sheet 1A); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES (1910) (Bayonne City, 
Ward 3, Hudson, New Jersey, sheet 5A). 
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silverware, and taking care of the son’s clothes and his dogs. 
On cross-examination, though, Demarest had asked the 
first neighbor if she had ever seen Julia do any work that a 
member of that family would not do as one family member 
for another. The second was challenged to justify Julia’s 
claims that she did the work of a professional nurse.25 
Cornelia Hudson’s long time physician had testified 
that he considered Julia Frean to have been Cornelia 
Hudson’s “nurse and attendant.” What nursing work had 
been necessary? He answered: Cornelia Hudson could not 
“go upstairs or outside without someone with her.” She was 
troubled with dropsy. That is, her limbs were swollen below 
the knees, making it almost impossible for her to get from 
chair to bed. “I would not have considered her a safe woman 
in the last five or six years.” Toward the end, she was not 
able to attend to her person. Most of the time she had 
control of her bowels, but not always. Then Julia attended 
and cleaned up. Julia, he concluded, had been a good nurse. 
But he thought there had been much conflict in the house 
about the question of payment to her. In cross-examination, 
Demarest asked the doctor whether the services Julia had 
provided were not ones that any “woman member of the 
household could ordinarily perform?” No, he answered, 
“[n]ot in the last two or three years.” What made her good at 
what she did? Well, in part that she had done it for a long 
time. She knew Cornelia’s “habits, her nervous makeup and 
her physical condition better than any one else would.” No 
one else could have done it. Was Julia like a daughter? 
Demarest tried again. He never thought of her that way, the 
doctor answered; he “considered her as a [paid] companion 
and as a nurse in the household.”26 Julia Frean had then 
testified. She too detailed all the work she done, including 
directing the servant in the household work. She did all the 
mending, and she would go out to do the marketing. She 
had expected to be paid for her time, but she wasn’t, 
although she did receive two dollars a week for taking care 
of Edward Hudson’s dogs. After 1910, in her rendition of the 
facts, she had taken full charge of Mrs. Hudson’s bodily 
care: bathed her every morning, clothed her, and fed her, 
and she had had to change her bedding. Cornelia sometimes 
  
 25. Frean Record, supra note 21, at 40. 
 26. Id. at 48-50. 
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soiled the bed. She did all the work usually done “in an 
invalid’s room.” 
Demarest had reserved the right to object to her 
testimony, since it was an open question whether a plaintiff 
could testify in her own case. But then he cross-examined 
her about her treatment within the family. He had her walk 
across the courtroom to demonstrate how lame she was. Too 
much so, he implied, to have been a real, that is, a paid 
nurse. She insisted she had been lame only for the past few 
years. They then went back through Julia and Cornelia’s 
life together. She had been remembered at holidays with 
gifts, and she had given gifts to other members of the 
family, and she sat with them in the evenings. She was 
certainly no servant consigned to the back rooms. When 
Cornelia Hudson still travelled, Julia Frean accompanied 
her, and they stayed in hotel rooms together. For years she 
had not been paid, but she did “fancy work” that she sold, 
and she paid for her own clothing. Julia described in detail 
all Cornelia’s excuses not to pay her. Why then, Demarest 
asked, had she stayed? “Because she never wanted me to 
leave her, and at last she was so sick I could not leave her.” 
Cornelia Hudson was very fond of her, treated her as a 
member of the family. And she considered herself a member 
of the family.  
At that moment, one of Julia’s two lawyers had 
Demarest repeat the question, presumably to give her a 
chance to realize what she was saying, since all knew that a 
family member, as such, had no expectation of pay. This 
time she answered that she was only treated as a family 
member by Cornelia Hudson, not by others in the 
household. The services were “performed” for Cornelia 
alone. Demarest asked again, “you considered that the 
services that you were performing for her . . . were as 
though you were a member of her family, as of her 
household, did you not?” She had answered, “Yes.” He 
repeated the question, then moved on. Had Cornelia 
Hudson become like a mother to her? “Yes, she was like a 
mother to me.” “You had no mother, had you?” She had 
answered: “No.” The occasional spending money you 
received from her, “you looked upon as spending money, the 
same as she would give . . . to any member of her family?” 
Julia answered, “Yes, between ourselves.” He pressed again: 
“You considered yourself, so far as she was concerned, a 
member of her household, did you not? . . . Practically a 
member of the family, with the possible distinction that you 
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were not a blood relative?” She answered, “No.” She did not 
believe herself a blood relative. But had she felt on an equal 
level with other members of the family because of what 
Cornelia Hudson was doing for her and what she was doing 
for Cornelia? “Yes.” (One might imagine that Julia thought 
she was showing Edward that she was a better child to 
Cornelia than Edward had been.) At that moment, one of 
her lawyers tried to intervene, on the theory that Julia 
evidently did not understand the questions posed (or the 
implications that could be drawn from her answers). The 
questioning went on: There was much conflict about money 
in Cornelia’s last years. Julia tried to raise the possibility 
that Edward Hudson had forged the codicil to the will. She 
insisted that Cornelia Hudson had promised to take care of 
her in her will.  
Demarest then returned to the question what had 
motivated her to remain and to care: “And up to that time 
you were rendering to Mrs. Hudson these services because 
of your love and your affection and friendship for her, the 
same as you had done for a number of years previous, 
depending upon her to give you at the time she died some 
legacy?” Her answer: “Yes, she always said she would.” She 
had known she could not depend for support on the other 
members of the family. It was only when she found out how 
little she got that she had become dissatisfied. Until then 
she had never expressed dissatisfaction? “No, because she 
[Cornelia] always said she would take care of me.” 
Demarest: “You felt while you were living with Mrs. Hudson 
that she was doing as much for you as you were for her?” 
Answer: “She died in my arms.” Question: “But you felt that 
the tenderness with which Mrs. Hudson cared for you and 
the fact that she was giving you a home from the time you 
had been unfortunate [presumably, here he was referring 
back to when she had been fired from a teaching position], 
was equal to anything that you could do for Mrs. Hudson in 
return, did you?” Her lawyer intervened again, because the 
witness was “a little upset.” (And one can presume he feared 
she was about to destroy her case for compensation.) She 
took a moment to compose herself. Then she answered: 
“Yes.” (One can only imagine the slumped shoulders of the 
lawyer at that moment.) 
On redirect, that is, when her lawyers regained the 
opportunity to question her, they had worked to reclaim 
ground. Under their questioning Julia described how, in 
Cornelia’s last years, her nursing services took up every 
2013] TWO CURRENCIES OF CARE 283 
hour of the day. She would be up several times at night, and 
there was no one brought in to relieve her. When had she 
become lame? “Oh, when I was taken sick, and then when I 
fell working for her and doing—I was worn out working for 
her and then I fell, and I have been lame ever since.” It 
happened in 1911. How much had her fancy work earned for 
her? Answer: Only forty dollars, earned one winter knitting 
sweaters.  
On recross, under questioning again from Demarest for 
the other side, she had admitted that if Cornelia Hudson 
were still living she would not have sued. She had brought 
suit only because of the way she had been treated by 
Cornelia’s child. This, once again, could be read as a 
concession that she had no contract with Cornelia. But then 
there had been one more set of questions from her lawyers 
(on re-redirect): Why wouldn’t she be suing if Cornelia 
Hudson were still alive? “Because I expect I should be living 
with her yet, kept right on taking care of her.” She did tell 
Cornelia once, though, that she would wait until she was 
gone, and “then I would sue her. I said I would not worry 
you now, she was worried enough.”27 In spite of Demarest’s 
efforts during the trial, in spite of her own concessions that 
love had shaped her conduct and her identity as a member 
of Cornelia Hudson’s family, Julia Frean won. As is always 
the case, the written transcript cannot fully convey what 
the judges and the jury saw and what they knew to be 
“true.” And effective lawyering can only go so far. We can 
surmise that Julia’s expressions of love for Cornelia did not, 
in the end, counter perceptions of the fundamental 
unfairness of the will Cornelia Hudson had signed (whether 
or not it was an expression of her intentions). Justice 
Bergen, who wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court of 
Errors and Appeals, rejected Demarest’s argument that 
there should have been a nonsuit, that the judge in the 
Hudson County court should never have allowed a jury to 
consider the question of whether Julia Frean was entitled to 
compensation. Demarest’s interpretation of the law “that no 
contract to pay can be inferred from services when the 
plaintiff was a member of the decedent’s family,” was 
answered by the fact that Julia “was not a relative in any 
degree” of Cornelia Hudson. The evidence was not 
conclusive that the services she had provided were intended 
  
 27. Frean Record, supra note 21, at 105-06. 
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as “gratuitous.” There was a “fair inference” to be drawn 
from the testimony that there had been “an express promise 
to pay what the services were reasonably worth.” And in 
any case these were questions that could properly be 
submitted to the jury.  
*** 
These two cases help make a conventional historian’s 
point—actually, two points that historians make 
conventionally. The first is that the past is a foreign 
country, filled with practices from which we today are 
estranged. I will at the end of this Essay return to this 
point, to challenge it or at least to complicate it. The second 
is that people living in the past had complex moral lives, as 
complex and sophisticated as our own. A primary mistake 
many make about the past is to assume the simplicity of 
those living there, in contrast to our own sophistication. 
Thus, some, usually on the left, assume that those in the 
past took care of others solely because of oppression, in the 
absence of the protections of the state, while others, usually 
on the right, assume that once upon a time there was a 
working private family where caretaking happened more or 
less naturally.  
In the period in the history of caretaking that I explored 
in my book, relative/nonrelative described both a crucial 
and absolute boundary and highly contested and complex 
space. On one side, on the side of nonrelatives, lay a 
familiar world of contract and (theoretically, at least) of 
arms length bargaining, a world shaped by a familiar and 
marketized economic order.28 Workers were paid. Maids 
were paid. By the early twentieth century, those who 
provided nursing care were paid. Farmworkers were paid. 
And all were paid wages.29 They were not paid enough; they 
did not achieve respect. But they were paid. 
On the other side, on the familial side, lay a world that 
is partially familiar but largely lost to us. We would 
recognize some aspects of their lives. They, like us, found 
negotiations for compensation within families discomforting 
and easily challenged.30 Spouses and other intimate 
members of families in particular should not, most believed, 
  
 28. HARTOG, supra note 3, at 7, 14. 
 29. See id. at 232-33, 264. 
 30. Id. at 28-29. 
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make care contingent on hard bargaining.31 There was then 
and now a strong doctrinal presumption that the ordinary 
things that one family member did for one another, 
including ordinary caretaking, were done without 
expectations of compensation.32 What was or was not 
“ordinary” care was—then and now—a matter of ongoing 
litigation and uncertainty.33 There was always an array of 
arguments and understandings available to challenge an 
expectation that family members should pay salaries to one 
another for providing care. Love, we might say, should rule, 
at least sometimes.34  
And yet, to shift to the lost or the relatively unfamiliar 
features of that world: nineteenth and early twentieth 
century family life was never conceptually separated from 
economic—working—life.35 That may be our understanding 
or fantasy, but it was not theirs. A nineteenth century or 
early twentieth century household was filled with workers, 
some of whom were blood relations.36 What distinguished 
family members from non-family members was not a 
distinction on the order of nonwork/work or love/work—
because everybody worked.37 Rather, the intimate family 
was organized using the currency of legacies, and that 
currency had its own rules and practices.38 (Note my 
dependence on the work of my colleague Viviana Zelizer.)39 
Or, to be more precise, there would be some workers who 
would be paid in cash, like the maid in Frean v. Hudson or 
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 32. See AMY DRU STANLEY, FROM BONDAGE TO CONTRACT: WAGE LABOR, 
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 35. Id. at 278-79. 
 36. Id. at 279. 
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 38. Id. at 279-80. 
 39. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 14-15 (2005); VIVIANA A. 
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the farmworkers in Cooper v. Colson. In the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries some of these would have been 
known as casual laborers.40 But there might also be 
workers, members of the family, who would be paid by way 
of legacies, through inheritance.41 Margaret and Julia 
belonged, at least in their own minds and in the arguments 
of their lawyers, to that second class. The boundary between 
those classes within the household was fraught and 
contested. But it was also real.42 
Let’s posit that in some sense Julia Frean and Margaret 
Sayre were both servants. We don’t know the intimacies of 
Julia’s relationship with Cornelia, or, rather, we only know 
some of them; nor that of Margaret with Joseph Colson. We 
know two things about them and about how they lived: 
there were others in or connected to the household who 
were just or merely servants—men and women who worked 
for cash; and we know that Julia and Margaret had become 
something else, something more; just as many who do 
carework today become something else, something more, 
because of the intimacy and the continuities and the love 
that shapes their work lives. Julia and Margaret marked 
that something else—their membership in that other 
class—in many ways. Margaret called Colson “uncle.”43 
Julia worked hard to make manifest her equality with and 
similarity to Cornelia’s son.44  
And yet the most important way they had of marking 
their difference from mere servants rested in the lawsuits 
they created and pursued: their assumption that the 
relevant economic currency for their work lay in 
inheritance, the very fact that they waited until their 
“employer’s” death, before seeking compensation.45 
In my research, I found case after case where older 
people (like Joseph Colson and Cornelia Hudson) avoided 
paying cash for the care they needed. During life, cash was 
not how one paid for care—certainly not for intimate care 
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within a household.46 But it would be wrong to assume that 
they and those who cared for them were not participating in 
economic transactions. The promises older people made 
were understood, and were meant to be understood, as 
commitments—contingent commitments, a property lawyer 
would say—but still commitments.47 They drew younger 
careworkers into work that was needed; and the promises 
kept them from leaving.48 And the cases I read were almost 
universally the detritus left from those transactions. 
Both workers and “employers” would have understood 
the rules of the game of legacies. At least in the Anglo-
American legal world, certainly so in nineteenth and early 
twentieth century New Jersey, the trump of testator’s 
freedom often played a determinative role in determining 
ultimate entitlements to family wealth.49 But testator’s 
freedom (real, though bounded by a variety of rules and 
limitations), the fact that many workers would not get what 
they thought they were working for, was no more a denial of 
the reality of the economic relationship than the 
employment at will doctrine or the entireties doctrine was a 
denial of contractual freedom in the non-familial world of 
labor relations.50 It was, rather, a shaping part of the rules 
of the game in which older people and careworkers—
workers like Julia and Margaret—participated. 
Of course, part of what made it complicated to play the 
game of working for a legacy was the cultural overlay—
composed out of romanticism and evangelical Protestantism 
and notions of separate spheres and so much else—that 
made the family appear as a space where work occurred as 
a response to need, without calculations of pay at all.51 
Moreover, workers like Julia and Margaret always had to 
confront a set of legal and equitable presumptions that 
made near blood relatives presumptive legatees.52 Lawyer 
Demarest tried to turn those cultural and legal overlays 
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into a trap for Julia Frean, and often (as one saw with 
Julia) litigants had themselves apparently internalized 
those understandings into their own contradictory and 
ambivalent understandings of their positions as working 
family members.53 
And yet, women like Julia Frean and Margaret Sayre 
were also perfectly capable of holding both their love of their 
employers and their sense of entitlement to compensation 
for work done together. It seems to me that they lived at the 
same time in at least two moral universes. And many of 
them managed the burden of negotiating around and 
between those two moral universes with remarkable skill.  
In one universe, that of the family/household, they 
earned rewards—moral and spiritual rewards, as well as 
material rewards—by sharing in a common family 
enterprise. The material rewards of having invested in the 
family might be frustrated. Older people—those in control of 
family property—usually did not have to act in accord with 
promises made or with apparent commitments and 
investments. Testator’s freedom remained something close 
to a trump card. The property owner, the older person, 
retained the right to change his or her mind, to deny 
promised rewards. There was no legal duty to share in the 
end. And the fights after death might have ruined the moral 
and spiritual rewards of family life, at least retrospectively. 
But within the moral economy of the family, women like 
Margaret and Julia earned rewards, if rewards were 
earned, by joining in, by being a loving member of an 
ongoing family unit. Remember Margaret Sayre’s 
description of the varieties of work that she did. They 
justified themselves within that normative universe by 
showing exclusive loyalty, by submerging their 
independence as competent adults, by emphasizing their 
continuing place in the family. (It is, therefore, not 
surprising that so many adult daughters and other women 
who served as caretakers—including Margaret Sayre—also 
put off marriage until parental or older employer’s death.)54  
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In the other universe, on the other hand, in the 
normative universe that a suit for compensation quantum 
meruit to a common law court or a petition for specific 
performance to a court of equity articulated, rights and 
identities as independent and contractually competent 
actors took priority. Subordination within the household 
was inconsistent with an adulthood that produced a 
successful cause of action. As was too much love. As Alexis 
De Tocqueville had famously put it, in describing the effect 
of inheritance on the lives of young American men, “[a]s the 
family is felt to be a vague, indeterminate, uncertain 
conception, each man concentrates on his immediate 
convenience.”55 
A good plaintiff’s lawyer ordinarily worked to cabin a 
client within the second moral universe and to suppress the 
often multitudinous traces of the first. But as we have also 
seen, the complexities of real lives kept leaking out into the 
testimony. And that made the lawyer’s work difficult. 
Revelations of sharing, caring, and love could become 
destructive to the case the lawyer wanted to make. 
Remember the anxious interventions of Julia Frean’s 
attorney as she described her love for Cornelia Hudson. But 
in the hands of a clever lawyer, it was even possible to turn 
testimony about how subordinated, how submerged, an 
adult child had been, into support for a successful right to 
individual compensation. Just as no competent individual or 
adult would have accepted the discipline of the factory floor 
without the expectation of pay, so it was with the adult 
child within the household. Margaret stayed; she did not go 
to Montana. She hardly received any compensation. She 
relied on Joseph Colson’s promise that she would have a 
farm. One ironic consequence of subordination and loyalty 
within the family was that it could occasionally become 
implicit proof of a labor agreement between older person 
and younger family member. Someone like Julia Frean 
would not have stayed and done all that work, accepted a 
role as a “dependent,” if she hadn’t expected to be paid.  
For those on the other side, for lawyers and their 
clients—executors and administrators of estates, as well as 
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siblings and others who opposed careworkers’ claims to 
property or compensation—there were many ways to mark 
such employees who had become wannabee legatees as 
something else—as greedy or ungrateful, as morally obtuse 
or dishonest, as forgetful of the primary moral universe in 
which they had actually spent their lives. Because of bad 
legal advice or because of their own moral deficiencies, 
these “family members” had insisted on rights to property 
or to payment. Instead, they should have understood 
themselves as privileged to have been part of loving homes. 
Or, they ought to have recognized themselves as gift givers, 
not as crass contractors. They were people who had done 
good deeds as individuals, in caring for older people. It 
sullied and darkened their moral status that they were now 
insisting on compensation for what they once had given 
voluntarily and freely, out of the goodness of their hearts, 
out of love. And always there lurked the question whether 
what they claimed now had been solemnly sworn and 
promised commitments—contracts—had really been 
something else earlier, before death and litigation. Was it 
only after the fact—sometimes many years after the fact, 
after the relevant speakers were dead—that mere talk had 
been reconstructed into contracts? 
*** 
Does any of this resonate with the experience of 
careworkers today? Are these dilemmas and negotiations 
ones that simply belong to a past that is gone? The weird 
practices of a now lost or forgotten foreign country? 
Certainly, the world of care now looks so very different 
than the world I reconstructed out of the New Jersey cases. 
Institutionally and politically, old age is today shaped by a 
pervasive commercialized and corporate health care system, 
by the identification of the old as the targets of corporate 
greed and commercial growth, by a pervasive state 
bureaucracy, and by the increasing presence of a global 
migratory army of careworkers. All of that makes carework 
look very different, and makes plausible the public policies 
that Peggie Smith argues for, which would attach 
careworkers to the political institutions identified with 
other forms of work, ones away from “the home.”56  
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And in general, for almost everyone, the economy of 
inheritance, the game of working for a legacy, has 
disappeared as a plausible life strategy. It certainly would 
make no sense, or little sense, as framing the work 
expectations, the reliance interests, to those who do home 
care today. There may once have been a language and a 
currency used to mark carework, framed by the presence of 
inheritance as a life strategy. That currency no longer 
exists.  
So, it all seems so very different, although I would 
expect (and ethnographic and other research confirms) that 
the contradictions that Julia Frean experienced are not that 
different from those that many careworkers experience 
today. When carework occurs “within” families (whatever 
“within” might mean) and when one is—when one 
understands oneself—as having become a family member, 
the boundaries between what one does out of love or routine 
or habit or custom or gendered expectations or whatever 
and what one does because one will be paid for it, will be 
experienced as confusing and uncertain, complicated. Still, 
the answer to the question, who is a family member, is not 
available today. Few today assume that a family member is 
one whose expectation of pay was through inheritance.  
And I think that absence helps describe a huge divide 
between then and now. At least that divide shaped how I 
framed the book I wrote. 
And yet, from the time I began working on this material 
and giving talks about carework and old age to various 
audiences, I have had people in the audience tell me that I 
am wrong, that the stories I tell speak to them, not as exotic 
travel reports from a distant “foreign country,” but as 
articulations of familiar facts in their own moral and 
emotional lives. 
What lessons should we draw from those “experiences”? 
How lost is the past that I explored? And to return to where 
I began, what should be the enterprise of reconstructing the 
experience of carework, past and present? 
 
